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A large body of experimental studies highlights the existence of social motivations besides self-
interest in decision-making process. This paper proposes and tests new extensions of the well-
known social preferences model of Fehr & Schmidt (1999). Extensions mainly concern the 
introduction of opponents’ payoffs differences and a simple element of reciprocity. We run an 
experiment on a three-player dictator-ultimatum game to collect data and to underline subjects’ 
behaviors in such context. Thereafter we use collected data to estimate fixed-effects logit 
models in order to test the relevance of proposed extensions and to compare the predictive 
success of the model of Fehr & Schmidt and the extended model. Results highlight a strong 
influence of intentions and opponents’ payoffs differences. The latter doesn’t display a sense of 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Economic theory rests upon the hypothesis of individual rationality and self-centered 
preferences, i.e. selfish individuals who seek to maximise their utility function that depends 
solely on their own material payoff. Large bodies of laboratory experiments supply results 
which are by and large not compatible with the traditional economic paradigm, i.e. subjects 
frequently choose actions that do not maximise their monetary payoff when their actions 
affect others’ payoffs and participants’ behavior is moreover usually heterogeneous. Such 
results highlight the existence of social preferences that “refer to how people rank different 
allocations of material payoffs to themselves and others.” (Camerer & Fehr, 2004, p.55). Idea 
of social preferences or “other regarding behavior” is not recent (See Pollak, 1976), but 
experimental method leads to a growing literature which allows the emergence of models in 
economics. By extending the domain of preferences to fairness, reciprocity or altruism, such 
models provide a unified explanation within the framework of classical microeconomics for 
behavior in several experiments. The main focus of these models is on decomposing 
experimentally observed concern for the outcomes of others into underlying primary 
behavioral motives.  
Existing models of social preferences fall into two categories that differ in how 
fairness is measured. In the first one - intentions models - subjects are concerned with the 
process leading to payoffs. Fairness is measured as intentions translated into individual’s 
actions which the other party can reciprocate. Depending on the feasible action set, each 
subject compares the action of the other subject with the action expected and evaluates it as 
“helping” or “hurting” action and reciprocates accordingly. Rabin (1993) defined this concept 
of “reciprocal kindness” for normal form games, which is extended by Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger (2004) for sequential games. All these models are based on the psychological 
game theory introduced by Geanakoplos et al., (1989)
2. Social psychologists used game 
theory to propose social preferences models too (See Gallucci & Perugini, 2000, for a 
discussion related to the importance of social preferences and their reciprocity model). In the 
second category motivations are primarily defined by the outcome of the game. In these 
models – call models of inequity aversion – fairness refers to the distribution of individuals’ 
payoffs differences (See pioneering models of Fehr & Schmidt, 1999 (henceforth F&S); 
Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000, as well as extensions provided by Kohler, 2005; Ottone & 
                                                 
2 Geanakoplos et al., (1989) provide a formal framework to analyse strategic situations in which hopes, 
intentions and emotions play an important role.   3
Ponzano; 2005; Montero, 2007; Hill & Neilson, 2007, for example).  The basic idea is that 
individuals do not only care about their own payoff, but about how her payoff compare to that 
of her partners too.  
Only, few models tempt to combine intentions and inequity aversion (See for example 
Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). The scarcity of such studies could mainly be explained by the 
complexity of their application.  
In parallel, some researchers (F&S; Frohlich et al., 2004) show that individuals' 
preferences are context dependant which leads to the development of context-specific models 
of social preferences (See Bethwaite & Tompkinson, 1996; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2005, among 
others). However, no model takes into account opponents’ intentions between them or 
differences in opponents’ payoffs into the utility function.   In this article, we propose to 
extend the model of F&S in two ways. To that purpose we introduce, into the utility function, 
opponents’ payoffs differences and, in a basic way, reciprocity through dummies variables 
that represent intentions. This last element allows us to avoid the use of psychological game 
theory and the related strenuous application. We focus on games with a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer, as ultimatum games. Ultimatums situations are everywhere. Public administrations tell 
individuals to present documents at a certain time to perceived rights, a mother tells her child 
to do homework “or else…”. In this paper, we use data obtained in a three-player dictator-
ultimatum game experiment to test the robustness of proposed extensions. Results provided 
by fixed-effect logit models highlights that determinants introduced here have a strong 
influence on the decision-maker’s utility and increase the accuracy of predictions. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the 
hypotheses of the model and confronts them with experimental regularities observed in a two-
player ultimatum game. The third section details the experimental design of the three-player 
dictator-ultimatum game. The fourth section presents the main experimental results. The fifth 
section tests the robustness of proposed extensions and compares the predictive success of the 





We firstly define some notations. Let us a situation of negotiation between  1 n+  players in 
which only player n has a veto power. We’ll call this last player the decision-maker. Letting   4
{ } 0, , 1 Nn =− K be the set of opponents i ,  opp n  the number of elements in  N . Players take 
their decision sequentially ( 0 i =  acts first, followed by  1 i = …) and decisions depend of the 
decisions of the previous player in the negotiation ( 1 i =  takes her decision with respect to the 






+ ∈ K  with  n x  the payoff of the decision-
maker and  i x  the payoff of opponent i. The decision-maker has preferences over allocations 
that can be represented by a utility function 
1 :
n UR R
+ →  established depart from the 
following hypotheses. 
 
 [H1]: Decision-maker cares to her absolute payoff and to payoffs differences. 
This model is in line with models of inequity aversion. The decision-maker has a linear and 
separable additive utility function that consists in two elements: the decision-maker’s absolute 
payoff and payoffs differences between players. Utility can be represented by means of an 
additive function of social utility which represents payoffs differences and a non social utility 
which represents decision-maker’s payoff. We rejoin on this point Messick and Sentis (1985). 
The first one allows for inter personal comparison whereas the second allows for intra 
personal comparisons (See Handgraaf et al., 2003
 for a related discussion of the relevance of 
intra and inter personal comparisons in decision-making process). 
 
[H2]: Disadvantageous and advantageous inequity 
Decision-maker is averse to disadvantageous inequity, i.e. when she obtains a smaller payoff 
than those of her opponents. Inequity aversion captures the idea that as  i x moves farther from 
n x  for some  01 in =− K , inequity increases and the decision-maker should dislike the 
change. However, here, we suppose that the decision-maker dislikes inequity only in case of 












). This inequity is weighted byα  in the 
decision-maker’s utility function. On the contrary, when the inequity is advantageous, it acts 












). This inequity is weighted byβ in the 
decision-maker’s utility function. This hypothesis represents a fundamental difference with 
F&S who suppose inequity aversion towards one’s advantage and one’s disadvantage; they 
exclude purely selfish individuals. Nonetheless, we keep F&S's assumption: α >β . This 
hypothesis is due to “Prospect  theory” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), according to which   5
starting from a reference point, individuals are more sensitive to a loss or disadvantage than a 
gain or advantage of equal amount
3. The weight of disadvantageous inequity (α ) is thus 
higher than the weight of advantageous inequity (β ).   
As F&S we normalize inequity to ensure that the relative impact of inequity aversion on 
decision-maker’s utility is independent of the number of players.  
 
[H3]: Decision-maker cares to opponents’ payoffs differences.  
This feature represents a new pattern in social preferences model. Its exclusion is justified as 
follows by F&S: "Furthermore, we assume for simplicity that the disutility from inequality is 
self-centered in the sense that player i compares himself with each of the other players, but he 
does not care per se about inequalities within the group of his opponents.", (Fehr et Schmidt, 
1999, p.824-825). 
Here we suppose that the decision-maker is sensitive to opponents’ payoffs differences in a 
selfish way. More precisely, we assume that disadvantageous inequity between her opponents 










).  In fact, 
disadvantageous inequity could first suggest an unfair allocation and thereafter a fair division 
of this allocation by others opponents and notably towards her. Disadvantageous inequity is 
weighted byη . Conversely advantageous inequity between her opponents 










) since advantageous 
inequity could suggest a first fair allocation and thereafter an unfair division by opponents 
who adopt an opportunist behavior to maximise their monetary payoff. Advantageous 
inequity is weighted byχ . According to “Prospect Theory”, we assume 0 χ η >>. 
Furthermore, we suppose that the decision-maker is more sensitive to inequities between her 
and her opponents than inequities between her opponents, that leads to  0 α χβη >>>>  
and{ } ][ ,, 0 , 1 χβη∈ . 
 
[H4]: Maximisation of the utility function 
Our model is based upon the idea that the decision-maker seeks to maximise her utility. So 
she will take her decision according to the following rule: 
                                                 
3 For a discussion related to the evidence of references points and their consequences, see Herne (1998).   6
- If with the proposed allocation she obtains a negative utility( ( ) 0) n Ux < , then she rejects it. 
Indeed, a rejection leads to a null utility which is higher than the negative utility resulting 
from an acceptance.  
- On the contrary, if with the allocation proposed she obtains a positive or null utility 
(( )0 ) n Ux > she accepts it.  
 
[H5]: Intentions 
We introduce reciprocity in a simple way. Since inequities take into account the gap between 
payoffs, we introduce only dummies variables which represent players’ intentions. We study a 
class of games in which no subject has a property right on the amount to divide. In such a 
context, the fair split corresponds to the equal one. Thereafter, we could say that if a subject 
proposes an amount weaker than the equal split, she has unkind intentions; otherwise she has 
kind intentions. 
i I  represents player i’s intentions towards player  1 i + . If player i has kind intentions 
then 1 i I = , otherwise  0 i I = . Intentions between opponents are weighted by δ . 
1 n I −  represents the intentions of player(1 ) n−  towards player n. If she has kind intentions 
then 1 1 n I − = , otherwise  1 0 n I − = . Intentions towards the decision-maker are weighted by ϕ . 
We assume that the decision-maker is more sensitive to intentions towards her than her 
opponents, i.e. ϕ δ > . 
 
[H6]: Complete information 
The decision maker has complete information about opponents’ actions and the payoffs 
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4 It is a simplifying hypothesis but this avoids an important aspect: the decision-maker's belief about what the 
opponents believe about her acceptance threshold. According to this belief, opponents' action can be seen as a 
kind or unkind action. 
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Example with a two-player game 
Characteristics of the decision-maker’s utility function 
Depart from our hypotheses we establish the utility function in the case of a two-
player game with a take-it-or-leave-it offer, such as ultimatum games. Let i the proposer and 
n the decision-maker. Decision-maker’s utility function becomes in such context:        
                                { } { } ( ) ;0 ;0 nn ni nnn in i ux x m a x x x m a x x x I α βϕ =− − + − +                          (2) 
where n x  and  i x  denote the monetary payoffs to the decision-maker’s and the proposer. 
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∂ ⎪ + > ⎩
 (3) 
  
Marginal utility is constant, positive and reaches its minimum in case of equal split 
and increases with inequities. An increasing in decision-maker’s payoff has a higher impact 
on her utility if her payoff is weaker than that of her opponent. This result is in contradiction 
with those found by Ottone and Ponzano (2005) where marginal utility is positive, linear and 
decreasing but also contrary to F&S who obtain a constant and positive marginal utility that is 
minimal in case of advantageous inequity. These contradictions are mostly explained by the 
taste for advantageous inequity (hypothesis [H2]). 
 
In order to determine the best response strategy, we normalize the amount of the initial 
endowment (X=1) and we note s the proposer’s offer. The utility function can be written as 
follows: 
{ } { } ( ) 1 2 ;0 2 1 ;0 nn n n i u s s max s max s I α βϕ =− − + − +  
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 (4)   8
and to reject otherwise. 
PROOF: Appendices A 
 
Results confirm that a payoff at least equal to the equal split will be always accepted whereas 
the acceptance of a weaker payoff will depend on the weight of inequity aversion. 
 
Confrontation between theoretical predictions and experimental results 
This utility function provides an explanation of traditional results obtained in ultimatum 
games. Since the experiment of Güth et al., (1982), various experiments are carried out and it 
results that, when the initial endowment is 100: 
 
1/ Modal offer is the division 60/40, which leads to: 
{ } { } 40 (60 40);0 (40 60);0 nn n n i uM a x M a x I α βϕ =− − + − +  
40 20 nn u α = −  
02 nn ui f α ≥≥  
The first condition is  2 n α ≤ . 
 
2/ Offers lower than 20 are generally rejected: 
{ } { } 20 (80 20);0 (20 80);0 nn n n i uM a x M a x I α βϕ =− − + − +  
r r u α 60 20− =  





α ⎤⎤ ∀∈ ⎥⎥ ⎦⎦
, our model is able to predict correctly experimental regularities 
observed in ultimatum games. 
 
Nonetheless, with a two-player game, the opponents’ payoffs difference cannot 
intervene in the decision-maker's utility function. To test the influence of differences in 
opponents’ payoffs the use of a game including at least three players is required. This leads us 
to use data obtained in a three-player dictator-ultimatum game (Bonein & Serra, 2007) and 
then we will test the relevance of each one of the utility function components. 
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III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
 
Game 
We conduct a three-player dictator-ultimatum game experiment which proceeds as 
follows. Player 1, who has the opportunity to divide an amount of money, makes an offer to 
player 2. This player has no veto power. She has only to propose a division of player 1’s offer 
to player 3.  Finally, player 3 - the decision-maker - has the opportunity to reject or accept 
player 2’s offer. In the first case, all players obtain zero, whereas in the second case each 
player receives the payoff contracted.  
Most of studies on ultimatum games focus on proposer’s behavior. Responders figure 
briefly in the analysis when it comes to examine rejections. Their behaviors are difficult to 
explore in more details since usual experiments allow them only to respond to a single offer. 
This generates a single observation for each pair of subjects. Although the ultimatum game 
allows responders to accept or reject an offer, it does not indicate how responders might react 
to other possible offers. It thus gives us only limited purchase on what is driving responder’s 
choices. To overcome that, we rely on the Strategy Method - proposed by Selten (1967) - 
where responders have to indicate whether they will accept or reject each possible offer. The 
use of the Strategy Method, within this framework, has two advantages. First of all, offers 
made in ultimatum games are in general close to the equal split and, as a consequence, there is 
no rejection and the experimenter can not learn on subjects’ capacity to accept or reject weak 
offers (Camerer & Fehr, 2004). The Strategy method provides information about responders’ 
behaviors that are rarely observed in traditional experiments. Secondly, Strategy Method is 




This paper aims at highlighting the determinants of decision-maker’s decision-makers’ 
(player 3) behaviors. To that purpose, all players have complete information, i.e. player 2 
knows the amount of player 1’s initial endowment and player 1’s offer when she takes her 
                                                 
5 Economic theory supposes that individual preferences do not depend on the method of elicitation employed and 
preferences are stable. Nevertheless, data obtained with this method need some scrutiny since previous 
researches have shown that the method used implies differences in many situations. Oxoby and McLeish (2004) 
show however that behaviors observed in the ultimatum game are stable and invariant to experimental protocol. 
Similarly, Brandts and Charness (2000) experiment a prisoner dilemma game with two treatments of 
information: “hot” and “cold” treatment. They show that if the representation of the game is the same, there is no 
difference in results between these two treatments. They conclude that “The Strategy Method may be a valid 
method for collecting a rich data set without affecting subjects' decisions significantly.”, (Brandts and Charness, 
2000, p. 234).   10
decision. Similarly, when player 3 decides whether to accept or reject player 2’s offer, she 
knows the amount of the initial endowment as well as the player 1’s offer to player 2. 
Moreover, player 3 has the opportunity either to decide refuse player’s 2 shares, whatever the 
amount, or to accept it starting from a threshold. We make the assumption of monotonicity in 
player 3’s threshold (i.e. if player 3 establishes her threshold of Minimum Acceptable Offer 
(MAO) at a level x- for a given player 1’s offer - then we suppose that she accepts all player 
2’s offers at least equal to x)
6.  
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects drew cards to determine their role. The 
game is repeated 5 times, with a strangers design, but only one period, randomly chosen at 
the end of the experiment, has been paid.  
Since we have used the Strategy method to determine the complete behavior of player 
2 too, the final results are obtained according to the following process. For player 1’s offer, 
we have associated player 2’s share, and once this division selected, we have observed player 
3’s decision. 
Altogether, seven sessions with 18 or 21 subjects by session, are conducted at the 
University Montpellier I. The 129 participants are mostly undergraduates’ students and no 
subjects participate twice at the experiment. Subjects were given written instructions
7. After 
all subjects have read instructions, an oral version was given. Then they had to fill out a 
questionnaire assessing their complete understanding of instructions. Once this questionnaire 
corrected, the experiment began.  
 Each session lasted for about one hour, starting for admission and ending with their 
remuneration. Subject's remuneration included a show up and the amount corresponding to 
their performance in the experiment. 
 
IV EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
We focus on the choices of critical third players, i.e. players whose choices determine 
whether the allocation is accepted or not. We proceed in two steps. We study firstly decisions 
undertaken in the first period to present the instantaneous behavior. Then we analyze the trend 
of decisions during the five repetitions. 
 
                                                 
6 Studies using the Strategy method suggest that the logic of responses varies. Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993) find 
that almost subjects are monotonic in their behavior. Conversely Bahry and Wilson (2006) show a violation of 
strict monotonicity. 
7 Instructions are available upon a request to authors.   11
Results obtained in period 1 
First of all
8, among possible decisions, player 3 has the opportunity to reject all player 
2’s offers, for a given player 1’s offer. We call this decision “categorical rejection”. We note 
a substantial heterogeneity in individuals’ behaviors (Fig. 1). 37.21% of subjects establish no 
“categorical rejection” whereas 62.79% of subjects decide to reject all player 2’s offers for at 
least a given player 1’s offer. The average “categorical rejection” is equal to 22.04% of 
player 1’s endowment.  
When player 3 doesn’t reject all player 2’s offers, for a given player 1’s offer, they 
decide either to accept all player 2’s offers – for a given player 1’s offer – or to accept it 
starting from a threshold. Yet heterogeneous behaviors are observed. Only 2.33% of subjects 
act as game theory predicts and thresholds observed are sensitive to player 1’s share. The 
modal MAOs is close to the equal split: 46.52% of subjects establish their threshold between 
40% and 50% of player 1’s offer to player 2. It is noteworthy to point out that 18.60% of 
subjects wish, on average, more than one half of player 1’s offer (Fig. 2). 
 
Knowing player 3’s decision for each player 1’s offer to player 2, we study the 
correlation between player 1’s offer and the threshold established by player 3. If we avoid the 
decisions corresponding to the “categorical rejections”, 54.76% of subjects demand an 
increasing share of player 1’s offer (nonetheless only 48% of these correlations are significant 
at the 1% level). Conversely 45.24% of subjects demand a decreasing share of player 1’s offer 
(74% of these correlations are significant at the 1% level). This last behavior suggests that the 
decision-maker does not take into account the amount obtained by player 2 when she takes 
her decision. She solely wants to obtain a significant amount. The sensitivity of player 1’s 
offer on player 3’s decision is confirmed by two regressions. We provide an econometric 
analysis of the absolute value of threshold and then of the relative value. Moreover, the data at 
our disposal allow us to use aggregate and individual information. However, for this last, the 
use of the Strategy method that provides several observations per subjects (one observation 
for each player 1’s possible offer) requires using panel data to control for individual 
unobserved characteristics
9. We rely on the Hausman test to determine whether a fixed or 
random specification is most appropriate. For both regressions the Hausman test suggests 
                                                 
8 Neither the Kruskal Wallis test nor the Mann Withney test reveal significant differences between each session. 
As a consequence, we study all data obtained as a whole. 
9 The use of panel method with data obtained by means of the Strategy method is usual (See for example Slonim, 
2006).   12
rejecting the null hypothesis of random effects in favour of the fixed-effects models
10. Finally, 
a cubic relation seems to exist between player 1’s offer and player 3’s threshold. In order to 
have an indication as to whether this specification is reasonable for the case under analysis, 
we proceed at linear and cubic regressions. For this last specification, we use centred 
variables to control for multicolinearity. Lastly, for all regressions, The Cochrane-Orcutt 
method is used to control for first-order auto-correlation and the White correction to control 
for heteroscedasticity. Standard errors shown in parentheses are robust. 
Results reported in Tables 1 and 2 support the strong and positive influence of player 
1’s offer on threshold established by player 3, both at the aggregate and individual levels. 
Player 1’s intentions towards player 2 are not significant which suggests that the decision-
maker does not care about the fairness of the division between opponents. If we look at results 
of the relative value of thresholds, we note that the cubic specification is justified only at the 
aggregate level. Finally, whatever the specification - cubic or linear - the positive influence of 
player 1’s offer on player 3’s decisions is confirmed. 
  
 
Evolution of behaviors 
The game is repeated five times to study a possible learning effect
11. At each new 
period, subjects knew the issue of the previous game – accepted or rejected – and the gains 
obtained by each player. One time this information revealed, a new period began and subjects 
knew that they cannot have the same partners. 
If we look at Figure 3, we note a slight decreasing trend of thresholds. Thresholds go in 
direction of the theoretical equilibrium without reaches it. This small learning effect is 
confirmed by the Friedman test (
2(4) 122.918, 0.001 p χ =< ). A closer inspection of thresholds 
at the individual level underlines the disappearance of thresholds at least equal to 60% of 
player 1’s offer depart from the second period whereas the modal thresholds remains between 
40% and 50% of player 1’s offer during the five repetitions.  
If we turn to the “categorical rejections”, the learning effect is less pronounced 
(Figure 4). The average level observed in period 5 is quite similar to that of period 1 (21.77% 
and 22.03% respectively) and the frequency of subjects who decide to establish at least one 
                                                 
10 The results are as follows: = 8.08, p=0.00176 for regression (iii), H=7.45, p=0.0063 for regression (iv) (Table 
1) and H= 12.19, p=0.0159 for regression (e), H=11.18, p=0.0108 for regression (f), H= 8.08, p=0.0176 for 
regression (g), H=7.45, p=0.0063 for regression (h). 
11 More repetitions would be necessary to study a learning effect but we are constrained by the duration of the 
experiment. For five repetitions, the experiment lasted one hour. Moreover, since it is a three-player game and 
players have different partners at each period, more repetitions would imply more subjects for an experiment and 
we are constrained by the number of computer too.   13
“categorical rejection” tends slowly to decrease. This leads to similar categorical rejections, 
whatever the period considered. In all periods, the modal “categorical rejection” remains 
established between 20% and 30% of player 1’s endowment and the frequency of subjects 
who establish “categorical rejections” until 50% or more of player 1’s endowment does not 
decrease. 
These findings suggest that five repetitions are insufficient to allow a clear learning 
effect. As a consequence, decisions undertaken at the beginning and at the end of the game 
are quite similar. 
All these results do not provide any information about the determinants that affect 
individuals’ behaviors and incite them to reject some divisions. To that purpose, we provide 
an econometric analysis with data collected during the experiment. The first data period only 
are used to avoid any potential influences of previous decisions or the result of the previous 





We provide an econometric analysis to confirm or deny our hypotheses. The utility 
function of the decision-maker depends on the one hand on the monetary payoff of the 
decision-maker and, on the other hand, on payoffs differences, in differentiating 
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where  3() ux  denote the decision-maker’s utility,  3 x  her monetary payoff and  i x  the monetary 
payoff of opponent i , with  { } 1, 2 i = . 
 
In order to investigate on the relevance of each one of these factors in the utility of the 
decision-maker, we provide an econometric analysis. However, data obtained in our 
experiment do not provide the exact value of the decision-maker’s utility. So a transformation 
is required. For that, we associate the individual’s utility to the probability of rejection since   14
we know, for each allocation, whether the decision-maker accepts or rejects the proposed 
allocation. Set the probability of rejection equal to 1. 
 
We can say, according to the hypothesis [H4], that if the decision-maker accepts the 
division, this means that she obtains a positive utility with the proposed allocation. In a same 
manner, if she rejects it, this means that she obtains a negative utility. In other words, if a 
given variable leads the decision-maker to reject the proposed allocation (i.e. it acts positively 
on the probability of rejection) this suggests that this variable acts negatively on her utility. 
Conversely, if a given variable leads the decision-maker to accept the proposed allocation (i.e. 
it acts negatively on the probability of rejection) this suggests that this variable acts positively 
on her utility. This modelling enables us to use a Logit specification given by
12  
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where  07 γ γ K denote parameters to be estimated.  
 
Nonetheless equation (1.6) cannot be immediately estimated. A collinearity problem 
occurs among the monetary payoff of the decision-maker and the advantageous and 
disadvantageous inequity between the decision-maker and the opponents. To avoid this 
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The first dummy variable corresponds to the prediction of game theory ( 31 x ). The second 
corresponds to a monetary payoff small that an equal split of the initial endowment ( 32 x ). 
Finally, the third dummy variable corresponds to an offer equal or higher than an equal split 
of the initial endowment ( 33 x ). One of these three dummy variables has to be dropped in the 
                                                 
12 We suppose that the probability of rejection depends lineary on all elements of the decision-maker's utility 
function. 
   15
estimation process to avoid a problem of collinearity. We choose the variable that has the 
strongest correlation with other explanatory variables, i.e.  33 x . 
As we have previously seen, the Strategy method provides a richer information set (the 
knowledge of decision-maker’s decision for each player 1’s possible offer) and several 
observations per individuals which lead us to apply panel data techniques.  We estimate is a 
fixed-effect Logit model. The iteration process uses the conditional likelihood to obtain 
convergent estimates. Nonetheless, the conditional likelihood does not provide the value of 
fixed-effects and excludes data of individuals for whom the dependent variable is the same in 
all alternatives (i.e. the probability of rejection is either 0 or 1 for all player 1’s offers). This 
last point explains that in results reported in Table 4 we have 42 individuals although 43 
individuals have taken part in the experiment.  
 
Estimations 
We estimate fixed-effects Logit model to compare the accuracy of the model of F&S and 
the one we propose. We recall that compared to F&S, we assume that opponents’ payoff 
differences act significantly on the decision-maker’s utility. Secondly the decision-maker has 
a taste for advantageous inequity between her and her opponents. Thirdly we introduce a 
simple element of reciprocity.  
 
To that purpose, we apply to the F&S’s model the same modifications applied to the 
presented model. In other words, we transform the utility function into the probability of 
rejection and the decision-maker’s monetary payoff is transformed into three dummy 
variables. In the model proposed by F&S, the utility function includes the monetary payoff of 
the decision-maker, the average of payoffs differences between the decision-maker and the 
opponents. Moreover, these differences act negatively on the utility whether they are 
advantageous or disadvantageous. The F&S’s utility function is given by                                           
  {} {} 33 3 3 3
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And the correspoding logit specification  
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                   (9)                        
whereγ denotes the vector of parameters to be estimated.   16
 
Column 1 reports the results of the pioneering model of F&S. We note that a payoff 
smaller than the payoff which corresponds to the equal split acts positively on the probability 
of rejection. In other words, the decision-maker’s utility is increasing with her payoff. We 
also note that disadvantageous inequity acts positively on the probability of rejection that 
confirms disadvantageous inequity aversion. However, our results deny advantageous 
inequity aversion since this variable has a strong negative influence on the probability of 
rejection. This means that the decision-maker has a taste for advantageous inequity. This last 
point is in contradiction with F&S’s hypothesis and attenuates the relevance of fairness as an 
explanation of observed behaviors. This result could be explained by the hypothesis of 
monotonicity in threshold of MAOs. Nonetheless, this hypothesis holds for player 2’s division 
only, since we suppose monotonicity in threshold of MAOs for a given player 1’s division. 
For example, the decision-maker could reject high player 1’s division (by rejecting all player 
2’s divisions, whatever the amount) and she could accept smaller division. 
We proceed now by step to measure the influence of each proposed extension. Depart 
from the model of F&S, the addition of opponents' payoffs differences increases the 
predictive power of the model for the decision of acceptance but decreases that for the 
decision of rejection (column 2). Even if the average predictive power is better than that of the 
pioneering model the Akaike information criterion suggests keeping the pioneering model of 
F&S. It is noteworthy that opponents’ payoffs differences are significant at the 1% level.  
A different conclusion occurs when we add intentions to the model of F&S (column 
3). In that case, beyond the significance of all variables at the 1% level (except dummy 
variables corresponding to the monetary payoff of the decision-maker which are significant at 
the 5% level), we obtain the best model with regard to the accuracy.  
Finally, the addition of both opponent's payoffs differences and intentions (column 4) 
points out the non-significance of intentions underlying opponent's division which leads us to 
exclude the intentions between opponents and to reestimate the parameters of the model.  
This last estimation (column 5) allows us to confirm all of our hypotheses (except 
intentions between opponents). It appears that the decision-maker's utility is increasing with 
her monetary payoff and the advantageous inequity between the decision-maker and the 
opponents. Conversely, the utility is decreasing with disadvantageous inequity. Opponents' 
payoffs differences are significant and they have the expected sign. This result highlights a 
new pattern in social preferences models. In previous models, only payoffs differences 
between the decision-maker and the opponents were significant. Results presented here   17
highlight the influence of inequity between opponents on the decision of acceptance or 
rejection. Nonetheless, they hide selfish motivations: the decision-maker wants to maximise 
her payoff and doesn’t care to equality between her opponents per se. Depart from this result 
we can deduce that - in our experiment - if player 2 obtains only a small share, this does not 
constitute a motivation to reject the allocation. This result has been already observed in the 
experiment of Güth and Van Damme (1998), who explain it by a decision-maker's strategic 
behavior: the decision-maker seeks to maximize her expected payoff without being concerned 
about other players' payoff. Lastly intentions underlying the division proposed to the decision-
maker act positively on the utility which suggests that the decision-maker is sensitive to 
intentions, even if they are formalised in a simple way.  
With regard to these results and statistical criteria (Akaike information criterion, 
McFadden R-square, % of good predictions), it appears that proposed extensions have a 
strong influence on the decision-maker's utility and increase the accuracy of the model (on 
average 84%). Results of the fixed-effect Logit model confirm the conclusion of our 
experiment: the decision-maker is not solely motivated by fairness concern. The decision-
maker wants to punish an unfair behavior toward her as well as to obtain a high monetary 
payoff.  
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One may then determine the marginal utilities. They depend on the ranking of payoffs 
between the three players: 
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As we have seen in the two-player game, marginal utilities are positive and constant (i.e. 
independent of decision-maker’s monetary payoff). Marginal utilities are increasing with 
inequities. In other words, it reaches its maximum in case of both advantageous and 
disadvantageous inequities (i.e. when player 3 obtains a payoff between than those of player 1 
and player 2), then a little smaller in case of disadvantageous inequities, then in case of 
advantageous inequities and minimal in case of equal split.  
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 (12) 
and to reject otherwise.  
PROOF: Appendices B 
 
Equation (12) confirms the self-centered motivations of the decision-maker. If the decision-
maker obtains a payoff at least equal to the payoff corresponding to the equal split, the best 
response strategy consists in accepting it, whatever the payoffs of other players. On the 
contrary, the acceptance of payoff smaller than the amount corresponding to the equal split 




We propose to extend the pioneering model of inequity aversion of F&S in three ways. 
The first one consists in introducing payoffs differences between opponents. The second 
refers to payoffs inequities between the decision-maker and the opponents in which we allow 
subjects having a taste toward advantageous inequities. Finally, we introduce in a simple way 
reciprocity through dummy variables that represents player’s intentions. Individuals in 
strategic interactions usually reject positive offer. Through this act, they reject clearly the   19
hypotheses of the traditional economic paradigm. This paper aims at highlighting the 
determinants of such decision. To that purpose, we run an experiment on a three-player 
dictator-ultimatum game and then we provide an econometric analysis with collected data. 
Fixed-effect Logit models confirm the relevance of proposed extensions. The decision-maker 
care about inequities between opponents, but this last does not suggest a concern for fairness. 
On the contrary, the decision-maker is sensitive to opponents’ payoffs differences so as to 
punish a potential unfair behavior towards her. Such self-centered interest is confirmed by the 
taste for advantageous inequity between the decision-maker and the opponents and intentions 
too. Proposed extensions enhance the accuracy of the pioneering model of F&S, notably for 
the decision of acceptance. Predictions provided by the extended model are robust with 
rejections observed in ultimatum games: subjects are not solely concerned by their own 
payoff, they care to payoffs inequities between them and the opponents, intentions and 
inequities between opponents too. Nonetheless, our findings attenuate the relevance of 
fairness motivation as an explanation to rejection of positive offers: results underline that 
motivation can be selfishness. We rejoin on this point Engelmann and Strobel (2004). Two 
directions for further researches would be interesting. The first one consists in confronting the 
extended model to data obtained in other environments where altruism or cooperation prevail 
in individuals’ behaviors. The second refers to the specification used to introduce reciprocity. 
Dummy variables are certainly the easiest way to introduce reciprocity into models of 
inequity aversion. A next step consists in using the psychological game theory to formalize 
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Table 1 OLS regressions with fixed effects on the value of MAO 
 
 
  Aggregate data  Individual data 

























2  0.9947 0.9942  0.659  0.659 
Nb observations  40  40  1480  1480 
Nb individuals  -  -  43  43 
Akaike information criteria  -10.0443  -10.7359  7006.124  7004.132 
F stat  3687.49  6734.85  886.24  1710.23 
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Log likelihood  8.0221  7.3679  -3500.062  -3500.066 
        Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1% level.  
a=0 if player 1 makes an offer lower than the equal split to player 2 and 1 otherwise.  25
Table 2: OLS and cubic regressions with fixed-effects on relative MAOs 
 
  Aggregate data  Individual data 
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(Centering player 1’s offer)

































2  0.9975  0.9976 0.9947  0.9942  0.6613 0.6607 0.6599 0.6599 
Nb  observations  40  40  40  40  1480 1480 1480 1480 
Nb  individuals  -  -  -  -  43 43 43 43 
Akaike information criteria  60.8554  58.8564  63.2589  62.5673  9716.316  9716.757  9718.345  9716.352 
F stat  3899.85  5360.90  3687.49  6734.86  498.36  662.78  886.24  1710.23 
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Log likelihood  -25.4277  -25.4281  -28.6294  -29.2836 -4853.158 -4854.379 -4856.172 -4856.176 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1% level; 
** significant at 5% level 
a=0 if player 1 makes an offer lower than the equal split to player 2 and 1 otherwise.  26





Fig 4: Evolution of categorical rejections 
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Table 3: Fixed-effects Logit on the probability of rejection 
  Model F&S  Model F&S  
with opponents’ payoffs differences 
Model F&S  
With intentions 




 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
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Akaike information criteria  26938.69  27852.96 24308.61  25210.05  25266.80 
Log L restricted  -22052.82  -22052.82  -22052.82  -22052.82  -22052.82 
Log L unrestricted  -13465.35  -13920.48  -12148.31  -12597.02  -12626.40 
LR 
2 χ   17174.95 16264.69  19809.04  18914.49  18852.85 
Prob > 
2 χ   0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
% concordant predictions (Y=1)  90.77  86.97  83.85  87.87  79.67 
% concordant predictions (Y=0)  68.61  80.13  83.87  80.16  86.11 
R
2 McFadden  0.39  0.37  0.45  0.43  0.43 
Nb observations  36120  36120  36120  36120  36120 
Nb individuals  42  42  42  42  42 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1% level;  
** significant at 5% level 
a=0 if player 1 makes an offer lower than the equal split to player 2 and 1 otherwise. 
b=0 if player 2 makes an offer lower than the equal split to player 2 and 1 otherwise  28
APPENDICES 
 
Appendices A: Acceptance as a best response strategy in a two-player game with take-it-
or-leave-it offer 
 
The decision-maker takes the decision that maximises her utility function. The decision-
maker’s utility function is: 
 
{ } { } ( ) 1 2 ;0 2 1 ;0 nn r n i u s s max s max s I α βϕ =− − + − +  
 
Three situations could appear: 
 
1/ If  1/2 s > acceptance will be the best response strategy. In fact, in such a situation, utility 
function becomes:  () ( 2 1 ) nn us s s β ϕ =+ −+  which is strictly positive (with  >0 and  0 nn β ϕ > ). 
Thus acceptance leads to a higher level of utility than the rejection.  
 
2/ The same result occurs for  1/2 s = . In that case, the utility function can be written as 
follows:  () n us s ϕ =+ ;  () 0 n Us >  due to hypothesis [H5] according to which  0 n ϕ >  
 
3/ If 1/2 s < , the utility function becomes:  () ( 1 2) n us s s α = −− . Acceptance will be the best 











Appendices B: Acceptance as a the best response strategy in the three-player dictator-
ultimatum game 
 
The decision-maker takes the decision that maximises her utility function: 
 
 




() m a x1 2 , 0 m a x 1 2 , 0
11
max ,0 max ,0 ii
opp opp
Us s s x s x




=+ −− − − ++
−− +− +
 
with  { } 1, 2 i = . 
 
   29
Several situations are likely to occur. 
 
1/ If  1/3 s > acceptance will be the best response strategy. In that case the utility function 
depends on the ranking of payoffs between the three players and four situations are likely to 
occur:  
-  If  312 x xx >>:  32 3 3
1
() ( 1 2 ) ( 3 1 )
2
Us s s x s η βϕ =+ −− + −+  
-  If  312 x xx =>:  333 ( ) (3 1) (3 1) Us s s s η βϕ =+ −+ −+  
-  If  312 x xx >=:  33
1
() ( 3 1 )
2
Us s s β ϕ =+ −+  
-  If  321 x xx >> :  32 3 3
1
() (1 2 ) ( 3 1 )
2
Us s s x s χ βϕ =− − ++ + −+  
 
In these four cases, utility will always be strictly positive since  1/3 s > and  0 α χβη >>>>  






s ⎤⎡ ∈⎥⎢ ⎦⎣
, acceptance constitutes the best response strategy. This situation occurs if and 
only if  321 x xx => . In that case, the utility function becomes 
333 () ( 3 1 ) ( 3 1 ) Us s s s χ βϕ =− −+ −+. With respect to  1/3 s = , 0 α χβη >>>> ,{ } ] [ ,, 0 , 1 χβη∈ , 





s = , acceptance constitutes the best response strategy too. This situation occurs in case 
of equal split between the three players, i.e.  312 x xx = = . In case of equal split, no payoffs 






s ⎤⎡ ∈⎥⎢ ⎦⎣
, the acceptance as a best response strategy depends on opponents’ payoffs.  
-  132 x xx >>:  32 32 3 2 3 () ( 1 2 ) ( 1 2 ) ( ) Us s s x s x s x η αβ ϕ =+ −− − − − + − + . The decision-
maker will accept the proposition if it procures a positive utility. For that, the MAOs 
that she is willing to accept is 
32 3 2 3 2 3
min
33 3











-  231 x xx >> :  32 3 2 3 2 () (1 2 ) ( ) ( 2 1 ) Us s s x s x s x χ αβ =− − ++ − + + −+ . The decision-maker 
will accept the proposition if it procures a positive utility. In that case, the MAOs is 
32 3 2 3 2
min
33 3















s < , the acceptance as a best response strategy depends on opponents’ payoffs and the 
weight of inequities. These last differ according to the ranking of payoffs. 
-    123 x xx >>:  32 3
1
() ( 1 2 ) ( 1 3)
2
Us s s x s ηα =+ −− − − . The decision-maker will accept the 



















-  123 x xx >=:  33 () ( 1 3) ( 1 3) Us s s s η α =+ − − − . The decision-maker will accept the 
proposition if it procures a positive utility. For that, the minimum acceptable offer that 











-  123 x xx =>:  3
1
() ( 1 3)
2
Us s s α =− − . The decision-maker will accept the proposition if it 















-  213 x xx >>:  32 3
1
() (1 2 ) ( 1 3)
2
Us s s x s χα =− − ++ − − . The decision-maker will accept the 




















-  213 x xx >=:  33 ( ) (1 3 ) (1 3 ) Us s s s χ α =− − − − . The decision-maker will accept the 
proposition if it procures a positive level of utility. For that, the minimum acceptable 




















DR n°2006 - 01  :   Stéphanie AULONG, Katrin ERDLENBRUCH, Charles FIGUIERES 
« Mesures de biodiversité et politiques de conservation : des 
notions complexes présentées dans un exemple simple » 
 
DR n°2006 - 02  :   Aurélie BONEIN, Daniel SERRA 
« L’influence de la connaissance du genre du  partenaire dans les 
relations de confiance et de réciprocité : une étude expérimentale» 
 
DR n°2006 – 03 :  Charles FIGUIERES, Mabel TIDBALL 
« Sustainable exploitation of a natural resource: a satisfying use of 
a Chichilnisky’s criterion » 
 
DR n°2006 – 04 :  David MASCLET, Marc WILLINGER 
« Does contributing sequentially increase the level of cooperation 
in public good games? An experimental investigation » 
 
DR n°2006 – 05 : Jean-Pascal  GUIRONNET 
« Capacité d’utilisation du capital humain et croissance de la 
productivité française de 1980 à 2002 » 
 
DR n°2006 – 06 :  Denis CLAUDE, Mabel TIDBALL 
« Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists : the 
irrelevance of privatization » 
 
DR n°2006 – 07 :  Stéphanie AULONG, Charles FIGUIERES, Sophie THOYER 
« Agriculture production versus biodiversity protection: what role 
for north-south unconditional transfers? » 
 
DR n°2006 – 08 :  Patrice BOUGETTE, Stéphane TUROLLA 
« Merger remedies at the European Commission: a multinomial 
analysis » 
 
DR n°2006 – 09 :  Leo K. SIMON, Sophie THOYER, Sylvie MORARDET, Rachael E. 
GOODHUE, Patrick RIO, Gordon C. RAUSSER 
« Structure and bargaining power in multilateral negotiations : 
Application to water management policies in France » 
 
 
                                                           
1 La liste intégrale des Documents de Travail du LAMETA parus depuis 1997 est disponible sur le site internet : 
http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr DR n°2006 – 10 : Aurélie  BONEIN 












































Thierry BLAYAC :     blayac@lameta.univ-montp1.fr 
Valérie CLEMENT :    clement@lameta.univ-montp1.fr 